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97068-8

Court of Appeals Case No. 350291-III

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

State of Washington,
Respondent

v.

Gabriel Ruelas, Jr.,
Appellant

Appeal from Division III of the Court of Appeals

PETITION FOR REVIEW

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page No.
Table of Authorities	ii
I. Identity of Petitioner	1
II. Court of Appeals Decision	1
III. Issues Presented for Review	1
IV. Statement of the Case	2
V. Argument	2-7
VI. Conclusion	7-8

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

<u>Washington Cases</u>	<u>Page Nos.</u>
<i>Burnet v. Spokane Ambulance</i> , 131 Wn.2d 484, 933 P.2d 1036, (1997)	6
<i>State v. Adams</i> , 148 Wn.App. 231, 236, 198 P.3d 1057 (2009)	3
<i>State v. Butler</i> , 126 Wn.App. 741, 744, 109 P.3d 493 (2005)	3
<i>State v. Diana</i> , 24 Wash.App. 908, 916, 604 P.2d 1312 (1979)	5
<i>State v. Fry</i> , 168 Wn.2d 1, 10-11, 228 P.3d 1 (2010);	2,3
<i>State v. Ginn</i> , Wn. App 872, 879, 117 P.3d 1155 ((2005)	3,7
<i>State v. Hamlet</i> , 133 Wash 2d 314, 944 P. 2d 1026 (1997)	1,2,6,7
<i>State v. Kurtz</i> , 178 Wn.2d 466, 309 P.3d 472 (2013)	1,2,3,5,6
<i>State v. Tracy</i> , 158 Wn2d 683, 687, 147 P.3d 559 (2006)	3
<i>State v. Williams</i> , 93 Wn. App. 340, 968 P.2d 26 (Wash. App. Div. 2 1998)	1,5,6
 <u>Federal Cases</u> 	
 <u>Other Authorities</u> 	
RCW Chapter 69.51A	<u>3</u>
RCW 69.51A.005(1)(b)	4
RCW 69.51A.005	7
RCW 69.51A.900	8
RAP 13.4(b)(1), (3) and (4)	1,2,5,6

I. IDENTITY OF PETITIONER

COMES NOW, Mr. Gabriel Ruelas, Jr., Petitioner, respectfully brings this Petition for Review pursuant to RAP 13.4 and respectfully requests this court accept review of the Court of Appeals decision designated in Part II of this petition.

II. COURT OF APPEALS DECISION

The Petitioner seeks review of the Court of Appeals Decision issued March 12, 2019, denying Petitioner a new trial in the Court's published opinion filed on March 12, 2019. The decision of the lower court is contrary to the Washington Supreme Court's decision in *State v. Kurtz*, 178 Wn.2d 466, 309 P.3d 472 (2013) and *State v. Hamlet*, 133 Wash 2d 314, 944 P. 2d 1026 (1997) and Court of Appeals in *State v. Williams*, 93 Wn. App. 340, 968 P.2d 26 (Wash. App. Div. 2 1998)

III. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

- A. Pursuant to RAP 13.4(b)(1), (3) and (4) the Supreme Court should accept review because the Court of Appeals has ruled contrary to the Washington State Supreme Court holding in *State v. Kurtz*, 178 Wn.2d 466, 309 P.3d 472 (2013).
- B. The Court should reverse in its entirety the Court of Appeals' decision in *State v. Williams*, 93 Wn. App. 340, 968 P.2d 26 (Wash.App. Div. 2 1998), as it conflicts with the holdings in *Kurtz* under RAP 13.4(b)(1) and (2) and there is an issue of substantial public interest under RAP 13.4(b)(4).
- C. The Supreme Court should grant review pursuant to RAP 13.4(b)(2) as the Court of Appeals' decision excluding the defense is an abuse of

discretion and contrary to *State v. Hamlet*, 133 Wash.2d at 324, 944 P.2d 1026 (1997).

IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The State of Washington charged Gabriel Ruelas, Jr., with possession of marijuana over 40 grams. At trial, Mr. Gabriel Ruelas, Jr., asserted that it was necessary for him to provide marijuana for his mother, who was dying from cancer. The trial court refused to allow the defendant to present his defense, holding that he must present medical expert testimony.

Mr. Gabriel Ruelas, Jr., had a medical expert which the court refused to allow for late disclosure. The medical expert was Dr. Gregory Carter who had extensive experience in the use of medical marijuana for treatment of pain. Nevertheless, the trial court refused to allow the testimony based upon the late disclosure. Unable to present the defense to the jury, the defendant was convicted. Mr. Gabriel Ruelas, Jr., seeks discretionary review of the Court of Appeals decision.

V. ARGUMENT

- 1. Pursuant to RAP 13.4(b)(1), (3) and (4) the Supreme Court should accept review because the Court of Appeals has ruled contrary to the Washington State Supreme Court holding in *State v. Kurtz*, 178 Wn.2d 466, 309 P.3d 472 (2013).**

Whether the trial court erred in disallowing a medical marijuana defense is a legal question the Supreme Court reviews de novo. *State v. Fry*, 168 Wn.2d 1, 10-11, 228 P.3d 1 (2010); *State v. Tracy*, 158 Wn2d 683, 687, 147 P.3d 559

(2006). In general, a trial court must permit a party to present his theory of the case if the law and evidence supports it; failure to do so is reversible error. *State v. Ginn*, Wn. App 872, 879, 117 P.3d 1155 ((2005); *State v. May*, 100 Wn. App. 478, 482, 997 P.2d 956 (2000). A defendant is entitled to have a jury consider his defense if he presents sufficient evidence. *Ginn*, 128 Wn. App. at 879; *State v. James*, 121 Wn.2d 220, 236-37, 850 P.2d 495 (1993). To raise a medical marijuana defense, the defendant bears the burden of offering sufficient evidence to make a prima facie showing. *Fry*, 168 Wn.2d at 11; *State v. Adams*, 148 Wn. App. 231, 236, 198 P.3d 1057 (2009); *State v. Butler*, 126 Wn.App. 741, 744, 109 P.3d 493 (2005), overruled on other grounds by *State v. Kurtz*, 178 Wn.2d 466, 475, 309 P.3d (2013). In evaluating whether the evidence is sufficient, the trial court must interpret the evidence most strongly in favor of the defendant. *Adams*, 148 Wn. App. 235; *Ginn*, 128 Wn.App. at 879.

The Supreme Court in *State v. Kurtz*, 178 Wn.2d 466, 475, 309 P.3d 477 (2013) noted that the common law may apply more broadly than the MUMA RCW Chapter 69.51A based upon possession of a certain amount. Additionally, the Washington Supreme Court in *Kurtz* held that “the 2011 amendment legalizing qualifying marijuana use strongly suggests that the Act was not intended to abrogate or supplant the common law necessity defense.” *Kurtz*, 178 Wn.2d 466, at 476. The *Kurtz* decision noted that the legislature stated that “humanitarian compassion use necessitates that the decision to use

cannabis by a patient with terminal or debilitating medical conditions is a personal decision based upon their health professional's professional medical judgment and discretion." RCW 69.51A.005(1)(b). To hold that this Act limits existing defenses for medical necessity would undermine the legislature's humanitarian goals.

The State of Washington has a long-standing commitment to and fundamental respect for the common law. Under the common law, a medical expert is not necessary to present the defense of necessity and nothing in the statute related to marijuana necessity defense specifically requires a medical expert to present medical testimony. It is common knowledge that a diagnosis of terminal cancer would subject an individual to intense pain and discomfort, knowledge the court is able to take notice of and which a trier of fact could reasonably understand by hearing the testimony of individuals close to and who have cared for a terminal cancer patient, which existed in this case.

It is the position of the Appellant that the defense's element of necessity requiring the defendant to establish whether a legal alternative existed could be satisfied through the use of non-medical experts who know or have intimate knowledge of an individual's chronic or terminal medical condition. Even the legislature in enacting the medical use of cannabis act determined there is a right to use medical marijuana as a legal alternative to other drugs and while it

also determined nothing in the statute established the medical necessity defense, its provisions seem to support it.

There has been no hardline rule requiring the use of a medical expert to satisfy the fourth prong of the necessity defense, although most cases related to this issue generally assume the evidence would be submitted by a “medical expert.” Notably, the cases which strongly support a “medical expert” are all pre-MUMA and prior to the general acceptance of medical use of marijuana. *State v. Diana*, 24 Wash.App. 908, 916, 604 P.2d 1312 (1979) requires corroborating medical “evidence” but whether that evidence can be submitted through the testimony of person’s close to and in daily contact with an individual’s condition, as opposed to testimony from a doctor, has not yet been determined.

B. The Court should reverse in its entirety the Court of Appeals’ decision in *State v. Williams*, 93 Wn.App. 340, 968 P.2d 26 (Wash.App. Div. 2 1998), as it conflicts with the holdings in *Kurtz* under RAP 13.4(b)(1) and (2) and there is an issue of substantial public interest under RAP 13.4(b)(4).

In *State v. Williams*, 93 Wn. App. 340, 968 P.2d 26 (Wash.App. Div. 2 1998), Division II held that an accepted medical use was an implicit element of the medical necessity defense, that the legislature was tasked with this determination and that the legislature had determined there was no accepted medical use for marijuana when it classified marijuana as a schedule I substance and that there could be no common law medical necessity defense for schedule I

substances including marijuana. Williams also held that there would have to be corroborating “medical evidence” that no other legal drugs were as effective in minimizing the effects of the disease.

Kurtz was then decided after the people enacted the act allowing for the use of medical marijuana and held that medical necessity remains an available defense to marijuana prosecution and that the act does not abrogate the common law. In *Kurtz*, the court noted that the legislature in 2011 amended the medical marijuana act “making qualified marijuana use a legal use not simply an affirmative defense.” *Kurtz* at 476. The initiative process has established that there is now a legal and public acceptance of the use of medical marijuana which removes the need for a medical expert to opine as to the qualities of other drugs and this understanding was specifically inherent in the *Kurtz* holding. *Kurtz* and *Williams* conflict and this Court should reverse *Williams* in its entirety recognizing the legislative and public’s acceptance of the medical use of marijuana.

C. The Supreme Court should grant review pursuant to RAP 13.4(b)(2) as the Court of Appeals’ decision excluding the defense is an abuse of discretion and contrary to State v. Hamlet, 133 Wash.2d 314, 944 P.2d 1026 (1997).

Finally, the trial court’s exclusion of the defense expert witness was a drastic sanction. While the admissibility of evidence lies with the discretion of the trial court and the court’s decision will be reversed if there is an abuse of

discretion. *State v. Hamlet*, 133 Wash.2d at 324, 944 P.2d 1026 (1997). In civil cases, trial courts use discretion in determining evidentiary issues as well. In civil cases, the supreme court has held that exclusion of an expert witness is a severe sanction, abuses the trial court's discretion and is reversible error when other lesser available sanctions are not explored and the sanction severely limits a party's ability to present their case. *Burnet v. Spokane Ambulance*, 131 Wn.2d 484, 933 P.2d 1036, (1997).


Because the trial court believed the line of appellate cases on the issue of the necessity defense required a medical expert to testify, its exclusion of the defendant's medical expert because of a discovery violation is quite severe. On its part, the State's position that it would have been unfairly prejudiced by the allowance of a medical expert mid-trial because it could not fairly prepare is untenable because the State, like the trial court, believed a medical expert was necessary for the necessity defense and from the beginning of trial expected the use of an expert witness by the defendant. The name of the expert is all the State learned of when the defense made an offer of proof the substance of the testimony (compliance with the fourth element of the necessity defense).

VI. CONCLUSION

The court erred by requiring medical testimony to present a necessity argument. The defense should not be required to present "medical testimony" as the constitution and the public initiatives and RCW 69.51A.005 and RCW

69.51A.900 recognize. Review should be granted for the reasons that the decision conflicts with published decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals and also involves an issue of substantial public interest.

Respectfully submitted this 11th day of April, 2019.



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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE

STATE OF WASHINGTON,)	No. 35029-1-III
)	
Respondent,)	
)	
v.)	PUBLISHED OPINION
)	
GABRIEL RUELAS, JR.,)	
)	
Appellant.)	

LAWRENCE-BERREY, C.J. — Gabriel Ruelas appeals his conviction for possession of marijuana over 40 grams. At trial, he asserted it was necessary for him to provide the marijuana for his mother, who was in pain and dying of cancer. Mr. Ruelas requests a new trial and argues the trial court erred in three ways: (1) in admitting his postarrest, pre-*Miranda*¹ statements, (2) in requiring a medical expert witness for his necessity defense, and (3) by precluding his medical expert witness from testifying because his proposed testimony was first disclosed after the State rested. Finding no error, we affirm.

¹ *Miranda v. Arizona*, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).

FACTS

On November 10, 2015, Sergeant Oscar Garcia stopped Mr. Ruelas for speeding. Mr. Ruelas rolled down his window and gave Sergeant Garcia his license and registration. Sergeant Garcia smelled marijuana coming from the pickup truck. He asked Mr. Ruelas about the smell and asked him to roll down his rear window. Mr. Ruelas complied, and Sergeant Garcia saw a large garbage bag containing marijuana. Sergeant Garcia then arrested Mr. Ruelas for felony possession of marijuana.

Before advising Mr. Ruelas of his *Miranda* rights, Sergeant Garcia processed paperwork to impound the truck. He asked Mr. Ruelas who owned the truck. Mr. Ruelas answered, ““My sister.”” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 40. Mr. Ruelas then explained that he was returning to his home in Edwall, Washington, after having cleaned the marijuana. He explained in detail how the marijuana was packaged to make clear to Sergeant Garcia that he was not selling or trafficking it. Mr. Ruelas said he had a medical marijuana card but did not provide one. Sergeant Garcia asked Mr. Ruelas where he had cleaned the marijuana. Mr. Ruelas answered that he grew the marijuana at his home, had taken it to his sister’s to clean it, and was in the process of taking it back home. Sergeant Garcia then read Mr. Ruelas his *Miranda* rights.

No. 35029-1-III
State v. Ruelas

On February 26, 2016, the State charged Mr. Ruelas with one count of possession of marijuana over 40 grams. Trial was set for May 24, 2016. On May 9, 2016, the parties agreed to continue the trial for Mr. Ruelas to review an offer and prepare motions.

On June 13, 2016, the trial court held a CrR 3.5 hearing. The court found that Mr. Ruelas's initial pre-*Miranda* statement was the result of a routine processing question and that his additional statements were made either spontaneously and not in response to a question likely to produce an incriminating response. The court denied Mr. Ruelas's suppression motion.

After the court's ruling, Mr. Ruelas requested a continuance to find an expert witness. Mr. Ruelas informed the court:

Judge, we're anticipating that there's a medical marijuana defense on this particular case. And so the Court's aware, there's still the necessity defense and we have an expert witness that I have to retain yet, but who will testify that the amounts that my client had were consistent with the use for the—for himself and the two other people he was providing for.

Report of Proceedings (RP) at 29. Trial was reset for August 23, 2016.

On July 20, 2016, Mr. Ruelas requested a second continuance to retain an expert witness, and explained:

We are requesting one more continuance of trial. . . . I think you understand that this is a medical marijuana case. We do plan on putting on the defense of necessity for going over the allowed limit. We have been in contact or trying to get in contact with Greg Carter. He is going to be our expert witness hopefully to testify at trial; however, he is medical director at St. Luke's and he's very difficult to get in contact with.

RP at 36-37. Trial was reset for October 25, 2016.

On October 7, 2016, Mr. Ruelas requested a third continuance. He explained, "There are some medical issues that I think will be coming to light at trial for which we will require an expert." RP at 44. He continued, "If this is indeed going to be ramping up for trial then our search for an expert will actually be fruitful at this point. There was no point in hiring an expert when we were anticipating a possible resolution." RP at 45. The trial court denied Mr. Ruelas's third continuance.

On October 18, 2016, Mr. Ruelas filed his final witness list. The list did not include a medical expert.

Trial began on October 25, 2016. The court addressed motions in limine and questioned Mr. Ruelas about his defense of medical necessity. Mr. Ruelas explained that he was asserting the common law defense of medical necessity, not the statutory defense under the Washington State Medical Use of Cannabis Act, chapter 69.51A RCW.² The

² The Medical Use of Marijuana Act was changed to the Washington State Medical Use of Cannabis Act in 2011. RCW 69.51A.900.

State objected to the defense on the basis that Mr. Ruelas could not lay a proper foundation without having a medical expert testify. The court agreed, and reasoned:

[*Pittman*³] says, “The defendant will be required to show that there is no equally effective legal drug.” You would have to have, I believe, medical knowledge as to what legal drugs are out there on the market that may or may not be as effective as to treat the symptoms that marijuana has in the case. I feel that that element and perhaps one of the others would require the expert testimony.

RP at 140.

The State put on its evidence and rested. Mr. Ruelas then told the court that Dr. Carter was available to testify telephonically, possibly at noon. Mr. Ruelas said that Dr. Carter had reviewed Mr. Ruelas’s mother’s medical records, and would testify, “given [her] medical condition [that she was dying of cancer] . . . there was no other alternative . . . for treating [her] symptoms” RP at 217-18.

The State objected:

[Mr. Ruelas has] had eight months with the case. We have no discovery with regards to this potential witness being even an option or that he’s going to testify. . . .

. . . .

. . . The fact that he’s not available to come in and testify, that’s another issue. The State would object to any telephonic testimony. . . .

. . . .

³ See *State v. Pittman*, 88 Wn. App. 188, 196, 943 P.2d 713 (1997).

So the fact he has in his possession 1800 grams of marijuana, . . . it is quite shocking that he wants to throw this name out and surprise the second day of trial.

RP at 219-20.

Mr. Ruelas responded:

I'm not inviting this, but I think the appropriate remedy is not the exclusion of the witnesses [sic], that might be viewed as being an extraordinary remedy and should not be taken. I think the Government, if they need time to prepare for this witness, can ask for a continuance to adequately prepare for the witness. . . .

RP at 221.

The court weighed whether to continue the trial or to preclude Dr. Carter from testifying:

[W]e just heard about this doctor this morning, day two of trial, and I do think it's significantly late. The case was filed . . . eight months ago. . . .

. . . .

. . . And I appreciate this witness is key to the defense and if the witness could testify as to what I've been told he'll testify. That would make that defense available. The necessity defense.

And I do think [the late disclosure is] a big problem and I don't think the Court has any alternative but to exclude this witness. I appreciate that would . . . prejudice the defendant's ability to present a defense, but it's not any type of an unfair prejudice to the defendant because he and his counsel have had a long time with which to get the witnesses [sic] *And it would . . . impose an extreme burden on the Court to have a delay and it would result in substantial delay.*

. . . .

. . . *The problem is there's two sides in the case that should have a right to a fair trial, and that would include the prosecution. The*

prosecution . . . may want to bring in their own witness. They may want to think about after they talk to this witness, what he says, and conduct some discovery to see whether there may be some other witness that might disagree with this Dr. Carter.

And to allow the witness to testify and to proceed with trial is unfair to the prosecution in the case here. . . . And I don't know what the Court of Appeals will do

. . . [But reversing under these circumstances] would almost render it impossible for a Trial Court to effectively manage a court calendar and do their job. It would, I think, encourage lawyers to not do their job.

So I'm excluding the witness. . . .

RP at 224, 229-32 (emphasis added).

The trial resumed, closing arguments were given, and the jury found Mr. Ruelas guilty. He appealed, and we granted oral argument.

During oral argument, Mr. Ruelas conceded the first issue on appeal. Mr. Ruelas conceded that his pre-*Miranda* statements to Sergeant Garcia were not prejudicial. The statements were consistent with his theory of the case—that the marijuana was for his mother who was dying of cancer. Mr. Ruelas even emphasized these statements during his cross-examination of Sergeant Garcia.

ANALYSIS

A. THE NECESSITY DEFENSE REQUIRED MEDICAL TESTIMONY

Mr. Ruelas argues the trial court denied him his constitutional right to present a defense when it erroneously ruled that a medical expert was required for him to assert the

defense of necessity. Mr. Ruelas’s constitutional argument fails because the trial court correctly determined that his necessity defense required medical testimony.

“Generally, necessity is available as a defense when the physical forces of nature or the pressure of circumstances cause the accused to take unlawful action to avoid a harm which social policy deems greater than the harm resulting from a violation of the law.” *State v. Diana*, 24 Wn. App. 908, 913, 604 P.2d 1312 (1979). The common law defense of necessity is available even though Washington has legalized marijuana. *State v. Kurtz*, 178 Wn.2d 466, 476-77, 309 P.3d 472 (2013).

A defendant asserting the necessity defense must prove four elements by a preponderance of the evidence. 11 WASHINGTON PRACTICE: WASHINGTON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL (WPIC) 18.02, at 292 (4th ed. 2016). The four elements are: (1) the defendant reasonably believed the commission of the crime was necessary to avoid or minimize the harm, (2) the harm sought to be avoided was greater than the harm resulting from a violation of the law, (3) the threatened harm was not brought about by the defendant, and (4) no reasonable legal alternative was available that is as effective as marijuana.⁴ *Id.*; see also *Pittman*, 88 Wn. App. at 194. Only the fourth element is at issue here.

⁴ WPIC 18.02 states the last element as: “no reasonable legal alternative existed.”

The history of the medical necessity defense for marijuana in Washington had been in flux until about five years ago.⁵ But when addressed, courts have stated that expert medical testimony is required to prove the fourth element. The medical necessity defense for marijuana was first recognized in *Diana*. *Diana*, 24 Wn. App. at 916. There, the defendant was charged with possession of marijuana but argued the defense of medical necessity. *Id.* at 909, 912. The court remanded to the trial court to determine if the defense applied, largely using the four element test described above. *Id.* at 916. The court went on to state, “To support the defendant’s assertions that he reasonably believed his actions were necessary to protect his health, corroborating medical testimony is required.” *Id.*

In *Williams*, the defendant was charged with unlawful manufacturing of marijuana, possession with intent to deliver, and possession of marijuana. *State v. Williams*, 93 Wn.

That has been modified for marijuana cases per *Pittman*, 88 Wn. App. at 194.

⁵ See, e.g., *Diana*, 24 Wn. App. at 916 (establishing the necessity defense); *State v. Cole*, 74 Wn. App. 571, 578, 874 P.2d 878 (1994) (adopting *Diana*’s reasoning); *Pittman*, 88 Wn. App. at 195-96 (adopting *Diana*’s reasoning); *State v. Williams*, 93 Wn. App. 340, 345-46, 968 P.2d 26 (1998) (holding that, with respect to schedule I drugs, a common law medical necessity defense does not exist), *abrogated by Kurtz*, 178 Wn.2d 466; *State v. Butler*, 126 Wn. App. 741, 750, 109 P.3d 493 (2005) (holding that the statutory affirmative defense in the Medical Use of Cannabis Act superseded the common law medical necessity defense), *abrogated by Kurtz*, 178 Wn.2d 466; *Kurtz*, 178 Wn.2d at 477 (holding the common law defense of medical necessity is still available even after the Medical Use of Cannabis Act).

App. 340, 343, 968 P.2d 26 (1998). The defendant asserted the defense of medical necessity. *Id.* Although *Williams* ultimately held that there is not a defense of medical necessity with respect to schedule I drugs, it first analyzed the medical necessity defense. *Id.* at 346-47. In its analysis, the *Williams* court recognized the test established by *Diana* and later adopted by *Cole*. *Id.* at 346. The *Williams* court also adopted *Diana*'s reasoning that corroborating medical evidence is required to satisfy the test. *Id.* The court held:

[T]here would also have to be corroborating medical evidence that no other legal drugs were as effective in minimizing the effects of the disease. Although this element was not stated in the prior case law, it would make sense that this element be expressed by an expert who knew the qualities of other drugs, not just the preference of the defendant.

Id. at 347. Although part of *Williams*' holding has been overruled, this part has yet to be changed. And its reasoning is sound. We conclude the trial court did not err in determining that Mr. Ruelas's necessity defense required medical expert testimony.⁶

B. NO ABUSE OF DISCRETION FOR PRECLUDING WITNESS TESTIMONY

⁶ Mr. Ruelas also argues he did not need to obtain an expert witness to assert the statutory defense under the Medical Use of Cannabis Act. We do not address this argument because Mr. Ruelas clearly represented to the trial court that he was asserting his necessity defense based on the common law application, not the Medical Use of Cannabis Act. "Arguments or theories not presented to the trial court will generally not be considered on appeal." *Washburn v. Beatt Equip. Co.*, 120 Wn.2d 246, 290, 840 P.2d 860 (1992).

Mr. Ruelas argues the trial court erred in precluding Dr. Carter from testifying.

We disagree.

A trial court may sanction a criminal defendant under CrR 4.7(h)(7)(i) for failing to comply with discovery deadlines by excluding the testimony of a defense witness.

State v. Hutchinson, 135 Wn.2d 863, 881, 959 P.2d 1061 (1998). But exclusion of evidence is an extraordinary remedy, one that must be applied narrowly. *Id.* at 882. We review a trial court's choice of CrR 4.7 sanctions for an abuse of discretion. *Id.*

In order to preclude witness testimony because of a discovery violation, the court must weigh four factors:

(1) the effectiveness of less severe sanctions; (2) the impact of witness preclusion on the evidence at trial and the outcome of the case; (3) the extent to which the prosecution will be surprised or prejudiced by the witness's testimony; and (4) whether the violation was willful or in bad faith.

Id. at 883.

Effectiveness of less severe sanctions: The trial court found that a less severe sanction, such as a substantial trial continuance, would not be effective. The court determined that a substantial trial continuance would burden the court's ability to manage its own trial schedule and encourage late witness disclosures. We note that the jury had been empaneled and it had heard most of the evidence. A substantial trial continuance

would have required the jury to return weeks or months later after the State interviewed Dr. Carter and then procured its own medical expert. By that time, the jury likely would have forgotten much of the evidence the State presented. The trial court reasonably concluded that a lesser sanction would not be effective.


Impact of witness preclusion on evidence and case outcome: The trial court found that precluding Dr. Carter from testifying would prevent Mr. Ruelas from presenting his necessity defense. The court further concluded that this prejudice was not unfair because Mr. Ruelas had eight months to obtain a medical expert. We agree. We also question whether precluding Dr. Carter from testifying impacted the outcome of the case. Although Dr. Carter would have testified that marijuana was medically necessary for Mr. Ruelas's mother, Mr. Ruelas would have been hard-pressed to justify why she needed 1,800 grams of it.

Prosecution surprise or prejudice: The trial court found that the State was both surprised and prejudiced by Dr. Carter's proposed testimony. Mr. Ruelas never formally disclosed Dr. Carter as a witness until the second day of trial. The State had no reason to obtain its own medical expert for the trial. Had the trial court allowed Dr. Carter to testify, the State likely would have needed a substantial trial continuance, which risked the jury forgetting much of the testimony it heard in the State's case.

Culpability of violation: The trial court did not make a finding whether Mr. Ruelas's late disclosure was willful/bad faith. Our review of the record convinces us that Mr. Ruelas did not act willfully or in bad faith. Mr. Ruelas explained that it was difficult to obtain his mother's medical records, which Dr. Carter needed to review. Mr. Ruelas also expressed difficulty in communicating with Dr. Carter, who he described as very busy.


Nevertheless, the weight of the first three factors are such that we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it precluded Dr. Carter from testifying. Mr. Ruelas does not cite any authority that holds that a trial court abuses its discretion when it precludes an expert disclosed during trial from testifying. We presume there is no authority. *See Oregon Mut. Ins. Co. v. Barton*, 109 Wn. App. 405, 418, 36 P.3d 1065 (2001).

Affirmed.




Lawrence-Berrey, C.J.

WE CONCUR:



Siddoway, J.



Fearing, J.

Renee S. Townsley
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*The Court of Appeals
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March 12, 2019

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CASE # 350291
State of Washington v. Gabriel Ruelas
ADAMS COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT No. 161000177

Counsel:

Enclosed please find a copy of the opinion filed by the Court today. A party need not file a motion for reconsideration as a prerequisite to discretionary review by the Supreme Court. RAP 13.3(b); 13.4(a). If a motion for reconsideration is filed, it should state with particularity the points of law or fact which the moving party contends the court has overlooked or misapprehended, together with a brief argument on the points raised. RAP 12.4(c). Motions for reconsideration which merely reargue the case should not be filed.

Motions for reconsideration, if any, must be filed within twenty (20) days after the filing of the opinion. Please file the motion electronically through the court's e-filing portal or, if in paper format, only the original motion need be filed. If no motion for reconsideration is filed, any petition for review to the Supreme Court must be filed in this court within thirty (30) days after the filing of this opinion (may be filed by electronic facsimile transmission). The motion for reconsideration and petition for review must be received (not mailed) on or before the dates they are due. RAP 18.5(c).

Sincerely,

Renee S. Townsley
Clerk/Administrator

RST:pb
Enc.

c: **E-mail** Info Copy to Hon. Gary Libey (Hon. David Frazier's case)
Gabriel Ruelas
29832 W Tucker Prairie Rd.
Edwall, WA 99008

Court of Appeals Division III
State of Washington

Opinion Information Sheet

Docket Number: 35029-1
Title of Case: State of Washington v. Gabriel Ruelas, Jr.
File Date: 03/12/2019

SOURCE OF APPEAL

Appeal from Adams Superior Court
Docket No: 16-1-00017-7
Judgment or order under review
Date filed: 11/15/2016
Judge signing: Honorable David Frazier

JUDGES

Authored by Robert Lawrence-Berrey
Concurring: Laurel Siddoway
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SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Plaintiff/Respondent,

v.

GABRIEL RUELAS,

Defendant/Appellant.

Supreme Court No. _____
Court of Appeals Cause No. 35029-1
Trial Court: 16-1-00017-7

**DECLARATION
OF SERVICE**

I, Douglas D. Phelps, declare as follows: That I am over the age of eighteen (18) years, not a party to this action, and competent to be a witness herein. That I, as attorney of record for the Defendant/Appellant, served in the manner indicated below, an original of the Petition for Review on April 11, 2019, to the following in the manner indicated:

COURT OF APPEALS – DIVISION III
500 N. CEDAR
SPOKANE, WA 99201

X Appellate Portal

I further declare that I served in the manner indicated below, a copy of the Petition for Review on April 11, 2019.

ADAMS COUNTY PROSECUTOR
210 West Broadway Ave., Suite 100
Ritzville, WA 99169

X Appellate Portal

I further declare that I served in the manner indicated below, a copy of the Petition for Review on April 11, 2019.

GABRIEL RUELAS, JR.
29832 W. Tucker Prairie Rd
Edwall, WA 99008

 US Mail

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Washington that the foregoing is true and correct.

Signed at Spokane, Washington on this 11th day of April, 2018.



DOUGLAS D. PHELPS
Attorney for Appellant

PHELPS & ASSOCIATES, P.S.

April 11, 2019 - 4:32 PM

Filing Petition for Review

Transmittal Information

Filed with Court: Supreme Court
Appellate Court Case Number: Case Initiation
Appellate Court Case Title: State of Washington v. Gabriel Ruelas (350291)

The following documents have been uploaded:

- PRV_Petition_for_Review_20190411161829SC908752_0912.pdf
This File Contains:
Petition for Review
The Original File Name was Petition for Review.pdf

A copy of the uploaded files will be sent to:

- RobertL@co.Adams.wa.us
- randyf@co.adams.wa.us

Comments:

Sender Name: Peggy Phelps - Email: phelps@phelps1aw.com

Filing on Behalf of: Douglas Dwight Phelps - Email: phelps@phelps1aw.com (Alternate Email:)

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